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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Silas Benjamin Parks appeals from the district court’s order denying his
post-conviction petition following an evidentiary hearing.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The state presented evidence of the following facts at the preliminary
hearing, at the conclusion of which the magistrate court determined that the state
established probable cause that Parks committed two counts of first-degree
murder and one count of first-degree arson (R., Vol. V, pp.1043-1047):
On the morning of June 24, 2009, at approximately 7:45 a.m., an
individual noticed smoke and fire coming from a duplex on Vandal Drive in
Moscow. (R., Vol. IV, pp.835, 837-842.) She called 911 to report the fire at 7:48
a.m. (R., Vol. IV, pp.839-840.) Firefighters responded to the scene minutes later
and recovered the badly burned body of Sarah Parks from a bedroom of the
residence she shared with her husband, Silas Parks. (R., Vol. IV, pp.847-855,
864-868; see also R., Vol. II, pp.311-313 (coroner report).)
Silas Parks arrived at the scene of the fire by 8:15 a.m. (R., Vol. V, p.884.)
He informed authorities that he had woken up at the residence at 6:45 a.m. and
had checked on Sarah before driving to a nearby Anytime Fitness facility to work
out at approximately 7:20 a.m. (R., Vol. V, pp.902-905, 1032-1034.) Parks also
told a University of Idaho student who was near the scene of the fire that he had
been trying to contact his wife via phone. (R., Vol. V, pp.878-879, 883-886.) The
Anytime Fitness facility was approximately three-and-one-half minutes away from
1

the Parks’ residence by car, and authorities were able to confirm that Parks
swiped his membership card at the facility at 7:39 a.m. (R., Vol. V, pp.908, 916.)
Authorities examined both of the Parks’ cell phones and determined that Silas did
not, as he told the University of Idaho student, call Sarah that morning. (R., Vol.
V, pp.897-900.)
A Fire Marshal’s Office investigation concluded that the fire started at or
near the foot of the bed where Sarah Parks’ body was found, and that the fire
started within ten to fifteen minutes of being observed by the initial witness that
morning. (R., Vol. V, pp.963, 1001-1003.) The investigation did not identify any
evidence to support an accidental cause of the fire, and thus concluded that the
fire was caused by the “interdiction of a flame to available and/or introduced
fuels.” (R., Vol. V, pp.990-1002.)
An autopsy performed by state forensic pathologist Dr. Jeffery Reynolds
confirmed the identity of the deceased as Sarah Parks, and found that Parks was
19-20 weeks pregnant at the time of her death. (R., Vol. II, pp.314-319; R., Vol.
V, pp.929-933.) Dr. Reynolds concluded that Parks died before her body was
burned by the fire, and that the cause of death was “Probable Suffocation or
Strangulation.” (R., Vol. II, pp.314-319; R. Vol. V, pp.929-930.) No evidence of
any other theoretical cause of death was discovered. (R., Vol. II, pp.314-319.)
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The state charged Parks with two counts of first-degree murder and one count of
first-degree arson. (R., Vol. I, pp.92-93.1)
After a mediation, the parties entered into an I.C.R. 11 plea agreement.
(R., Vol. I, pp.94-97; Tr., p.301, Ls.1-9.) Parks’ counsel advised him to take the
plea offer set forth by the state. (Tr., p.201, Ls.8-10.) Parks agreed to plead
guilty to first-degree arson and to two amended charges of voluntary
manslaughter. (R., Vol. I, pp.95-103.) The parties also agreed that Parks would
remain at his parents’ residence pending sentencing, that the sentences for the
two voluntary manslaughter charges would run concurrently with each other, that
Parks would waive his right to appeal, and that the parties would be free to
recommend any lawful sentence.

(R., Vol. I, p.95.)

At the change of plea

hearing, Parks provided a factual basis for the pleas by stating “that’s what I did,”
when asked by the court why he was pleading guilty to first-degree arson and
two counts of voluntary manslaughter.

(R., Vol. II, p.291.)

Parks further

answered in the affirmative when asked by the court if he committed the acts as
alleged in the amended charging information. (Id.) Parks’ trial counsel also
stipulated to the factual basis of the guilty pleas. (R., Vol. II, p.292.)
At the sentencing hearing, Parks recommended that the district court
impose three concurrent 15-year sentences, each with five years fixed, for the
three charges. (R., Vol. II, p.349.) The state recommended that the court impose
concurrent fixed 15-year sentences for the two voluntary manslaughter charges,
1

The district court took judicial notice of documents associated with the
underlying criminal case. (R., Vol. IV, pp.795-800.) Many of these documents
were also attached to various filings made in the post-conviction case. (See
generally R.)
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and a consecutive 25-year fixed sentence for first-degree arson, which would
result in a cumulative 40-year fixed sentence. (R., Vol. II, p.353.) The district
court imposed concurrent 15-year fixed sentences for the two voluntary
manslaughter charges, and a consecutive 25-year sentence with five years fixed
for first-degree arson. (R., Vol. I, pp.105-108, 111-114; R., Vol. II, pp.354-356.)
This resulted in a cumulative 40-year sentence with 20 years fixed. The district
court denied Parks’ subsequent I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence. (R.,
Vol. I, p.166.) Parks did not attempt to appeal from the judgment of conviction.
In September 2011, Parks filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief.
(R., Vol. I, pp.20-25.) The district court appointed counsel to represent Parks on
the petition.

(R., Vol. I, pp.221-222.)

Substitute counsel later made an

appearance. (R., Vol. II, pp.237-239.) Through counsel, Parks filed an amended
post-conviction petition and memorandum in support. (R., Vol. II, pp.250-259,
365-401.) Parks alleged: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain a
forensic pathologist to challenge the conclusions of the state autopsy report with
regard to Sarah Parks’ cause of death before advising Parks to accept the state’s
plea offer; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain an expert to present
evidence, at the sentencing hearing, regarding Parks’ alleged lack of memory
surrounding Sarah Parks’ death; and (3) based upon these ineffective assistance
of counsel claims, there existed material facts, not previously presented and
heard, that required a vacating of the judgment of conviction in the interest of
justice pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4). (Id.)

4

Parks supported his first ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim with
an affidavit and report prepared by Dr. Jonathan L. Arden of Arden Forensics, a
consulting practice based in Virginia.

(R., Vol. II, pp.261-266.)

Dr. Arden

reviewed the state’s coroner and autopsy reports and concluded that, while it was
“reasonable to consider some form of asphyxiation” as having caused Sarah
Parks’ death, Dr. Reynolds should have recorded the cause of death as
“undetermined” in light of the “limitations imposed by the thermal destruction of
the critical evidence” due to the fire, and because, Dr. Arden asserted, some of
the methods relied upon by Dr. Reynolds were not reliable or did not adequately
support his conclusions. (Id.) Parks also submitted an affidavit in which he
alleged that, had he known that the state’s autopsy results could be challenged in
this manner, he would not have accepted the state’s plea offer and would have
insisted to proceeding to trial. (R., Vol. II, pp.276-278.)
The state moved for the summary dismissal of Parks’ amended postconviction petition.

(R., Vol. III, pp.459-477.)

The district court granted the

motion with respect to Parks’ claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
retain an expert to present evidence at the sentencing hearing regarding Parks’
alleged lack of memory of Sarah Parks’ death.2 (R., Vol. III, pp.499-500.) The
district court denied the motion with respect to Parks’ claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to retain a forensic pathologist. (R., Vol. III, pp.497-488.)
The district court did not expressly analyze or reach any conclusions regarding

2

Parks does not challenge this conclusion on appeal.
5

Parks’ I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) newly discovered evidence claim. (See R., Vol. III,
pp.494-501.)
An evidentiary hearing was conducted on Parks’ remaining ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. (Tr.) Parks, Parks’ two trial attorneys, Dr. Arden, a
federal ATF agent who investigated the fire, and a criminal defense attorney
retained by the state as an expert witness testified at the hearing. (Id.)
At the conclusion of the hearing, and after both parties submitted written
closing argument (R., Vol. VI, pp.1188-1251), the district court denied Parks’
remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claim and dismissed Parks’ postconviction petition as a whole (R., Vol. VI, pp.1267-1276). The court concluded
that Parks failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel provided deficient
performance by advising Parks to accept the state’s plea offer without first
retaining a forensic pathologist to investigate the state autopsy conclusions. (Id.)
The court did not reach the prejudice prong of Strickland.3 (Id.) Parks timely
appealed. (R., Vol. VI, pp.1279-1286.)

3

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).
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ISSUES
Parks states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Does defense counsels’ representation fall below
constitutional standards mandating that the defendant’s
guilty pleas and plea bargain be set aside when (1) the
cause of death in a first-degree murder prosecution is not
obvious and is dependent upon scientific evaluation, (2) the
accused person is unwilling or unable to explain the cause of
death to his lawyers, (3) defense counsel fail to investigate
the cause of death and allow the prosecution’s forensic
investigation to go unchallenged, (4) defense counsel advise
the client to accept a plea bargain which results in the
imposition of a 20- to 40- year prison sentence, (5) the
District Court accepts that plea bargain without requiring the
defendant to allocute to facts which support the guilty pleas,
and (6) scientific evidence rebutting the prosecution’s theory
of the cause of death was readily available had an
investigation by defense counsel occurred?

2.

Do the newly presented material facts not previously
presented and heard require vacatur of the convictions
and/or sentences in the interest of justice pursuant to I.C.
§ 19-4901(a)(4)?

(Appellant’s brief, p.22)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Parks failed to show that the district court erred by denying,
following an evidentiary hearing, his post-conviction claim that his
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain a forensic
pathologist prior to advising Parks to plead guilty?

2.

Has Parks failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief on his
I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) new evidence claim?

7

ARGUMENT
I.
Parks Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Denying, Following
An Evidentiary Hearing, His Post-Conviction Claim That His Trial Counsel Was
Ineffective For Failing To Retain A Forensic Pathologist Prior To Advising Parks
To Plead Guilty
A.

Introduction
In his amended post-conviction petition, Parks alleged that his trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to retain a forensic pathologist to challenge the
state autopsy report’s conclusions regarding Sarah Parks’ cause of death. (R.,
Vol. II, pp.253-254, 373-394.) On appeal, Parks has failed to assign specific
error to the district court’s denial of this claim. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.23-41.)
Parks has therefore waived this issue for appeal. In any event, a review of the
record reveals that the district court correctly concluded that Parks failed to
demonstrate that his trial counsel provided deficient performance, and that Parks
has also failed to demonstrate prejudice from any alleged deficiency. This Court
should therefore affirm the district court’s denial of this claim.
B.

Standard Of Review
A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which his claim is based.
Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430, 436, 725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986). A trial court’s
decision that the petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled to great
weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990).
Where the district court conducts a hearing and enters findings of fact and
conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they
8

are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the
district court from those facts.

Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-277,

971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be
given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all
matters solely within the province of the district court.

Peterson v. State,

139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003).
C.

Parks Has Waived This Issue On Appeal Because He Has Failed To
Assign Specific Error To The District Court
It is a well-settled tenet of appellate review that the “party alleging error

has the burden of showing it in the record.” Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc.,
156 Idaho 37, 320 P.3d 428 (2014). It is equally well-settled that the appellate
court will not review actions of the district court for which no error has been
assigned and will not otherwise search the record for unspecified errors. State v.
Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 159, 657 P.2d 17, 23 (1983); Liponis v. Bach,
149 Idaho 372, 374-375, 234 P.3d 696, 698-699 (2010) (“...to the extent that an
assignment of error is not argued and supported in compliance with the I.A.R., it
is deemed to be waived”). Moreover, “[a] party waives an issue on appeal if
either authority or argument are lacking.” State v. Freitas, 157 Idaho 257, 267,
335 P.3d 597, 607 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263,
923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)).
In this case, Parks has failed to assign any specific error to the district
court with respect to its denial of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.
(See Appellant’s brief, pp.22-41.) In fact, Parks has failed to allege any district
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court error, specific or otherwise. Both the “Issues Presented on Appeal” and
“Argument” sections of Parks’ Appellant’s brief assert only that Parks’ trial
counsel was ineffective, not that the district court erred in denying this claim. (Id.)
Parks did not challenge any of the factual findings,4 legal standards utilized, or
legal analysis conducted by the district court. This Court should not conduct a
blanket review of the district court’s findings and legal analysis in the absence of
such assigned error.
Because Parks has failed to assign any error, let alone specific error, to
the district court, he has waived this claim for consideration on appeal. This
Court should therefore decline to search the record for unspecified errors and
instead affirm the determination of the district court.
D.

Even If This Court Reaches The Merits Of This Claim, Parks Has Failed To
Show That The District Court Erred
Even if this Court chooses to construe Parks’ brief as contending that the

district court erred, in a general sense, in denying his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, Parks has failed to show that the district court erred.
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act.

I.C. § 19-4901, et seq.

A petition for post-conviction relief

initiates a new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the
burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho

4

Therefore, even to the extent that this Court considers the merits of Parks’
appellate claims, it is bound by the factual findings of the district court as set forth
in its order denying Parks’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (See R., Vol.
VI, pp.1267-1274.)
10

518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678,
662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must
demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129,
137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989).
An attorney’s performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct is within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989).
A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of
counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s
perspective at the time. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. “[S]trategic choices made
after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are
virtually unchallengeable ….” Id. at 690.
“[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any
ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly
assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure
of deference to counsel’s judgments.”

Id. at 691.

However, “the duty to

investigate does not force defense lawyers to scour the globe on the off chance
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something will turn up; reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they
have good reason to think further investigation would be a waste.” Rompilla v.
Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005). “When counsel focuses on some issues to the
exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he or she did so for
tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect.” Suits v. State, 143 Idaho
160, 164, 139 P.3d 762, 766 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing Yarborough v. Gentry,
540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)).
With respect to a trial counsel’s pretrial investigation, the Idaho Supreme
Court has further explained:
The obligation of defense counsel is to conduct a prompt
and thorough pretrial investigation, which should include efforts to
secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law
enforcement authorities. However, the course of the investigation
will naturally be shaped by a defendant’s disclosure to his counsel,
by his mental condition, by counsel’s preliminary knowledge of the
evidence against the defendant and by a variety of factors, many
peculiar to each given case.
State v. Perez, 99 Idaho 181, 184, 579 P.2d 127, 130 (1978) (citation omitted).
To establish Strickland prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761,
760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241,
244 (Ct. App. 1999). With respect to Strickland prejudice stemming from claims
that trial counsel performed an inadequate investigation prior to the entry of a
defendant’s guilty plea, the United States Supreme Court has explained:
[W]here the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or
discover potentially exculpatory evidence, the determination
whether the error “prejudiced” the defendant by causing him to
12

plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on the likelihood that
discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his
recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, will
depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely
would have changed the outcome of a trial.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
1.

Parks Failed To Demonstrate Deficient Performance

As the district court concluded (R., Vol. VI, pp.1270-1272), Parks failed to
demonstrate that his trial counsel5 provided deficient performance by advising
him to plead guilty before retaining a forensic pathologist to challenge the state’s
autopsy conclusions. Counsel’s advice was entirely reasonable in light of the
strong evidence of Parks’ guilt, the admissions of guilt Park made to trial counsel,
counsel’s professional opinion regarding the likely outcome of a trial, and the
state’s willingness to amend Parks’ two first-degree murder charges.
It was evident from the preliminary hearing that the state possessed
strong evidence of Parks’ guilt.

The timing of when the fire was first observed

(R., Vol. IV, pp.837-842) and when Parks arrived at the Anytime Fitness facility
(R., Vol. V, p.916), combined with the fire investigation’s conclusion regarding
when the fire started (R., Vol. V, pp.1002-1003), created a tight timeline that fully
supported the state’s theory of the case that Parks killed his wife and then started
a fire at or near the foot of the bed. The fire investigation’s conclusions ruling out
accidental causes of the fire (R., Vol. V, pp.990-1002), and the state autopsy
5

Two public defenders, Ray Barker and Charles Kovis, represented Parks in the
underlying criminal case. (Tr., p.292, Ls.9-11; p.328, Ls.6-16.) Both attorneys
testified at the evidentiary hearing and were deposed by Parks in the course of
the post-conviction proceeding. (R., Vol. III, pp.540-575; Tr., p.289, L.19 – p.373,
L.14.) In this brief, the state discusses the representation of the two attorneys
collectively.
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report’s conclusion that Sarah Parks died of “Probable Suffocation or
Strangulation” and was already dead by the time the fire burned her body (R.,
Vol. II, pp.314-319), further supported the state’s case. Additionally, neither the
fire investigation nor autopsy identified any evidence supporting any other cause
of death, or cause of fire, that would, if true, exonerate Parks. Indeed, attempting
to theorize an innocent explanation for Sarah Parks’ death and the subsequent
fire strains credulity. Sarah Parks would have had to have died suddenly of
some natural cause unsupported by the evidence almost immediately after Parks
left the house, and then, almost immediately after she died, a non-accidental fire
would have had to have been started by an unknown person at the foot of the
same bed Sarah Parks died on (or, such a fire would have had to have been
started by some accidental cause unsupported by the evidence).
Parks made several admissions of guilt to his trial attorneys which
reasonably impacted the strategy they employed in resolving the case. Parks
told trial counsel that he recalled putting his hands around Sarah’s neck and
starting the fire. (R., Vol. III, pp.543, 549-550, 623; Tr., p.303, Ls.2-19; p.318,
L.13 – p.319, L.6.) Trial counsel interpreted these admissions from Parks as
“reluctant” acknowledgments that he had committed the crimes as alleged. (R.,
Vol. III, pp.549-550; Tr., p.304, L.23 – p.305, L.5.) Trial counsel did not find
credible Parks’ assertions that he did not fully remember what happened the
morning Sarah Parks died. (R., Vol. III, pp.570, 606; Tr., p.365, L.5 – p.366,
L.11.) In light of the state’s evidence of guilt, and these admissions, trial counsel
reasonably began to focus on mitigation. (R., Vol. III, pp.598-599.)
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Trial counsel further testified that in light of the circumstances of the case,
convictions for first-degree arson and voluntary manslaughter (rather than firstdegree murder) would be the “best possible outcome” following a jury trial. (R.,
Vol. III, pp.517-518, 527-528, 604-605; Tr., p.302, Ls.11-17; p.336, L.9 – p.338,
L.14.)

Trial counsel was, in fact, surprised by the state’s plea offer and

willingness to amend both first-degree murder charges. (Tr., p.343, Ls.5-22.) In
light of this evaluation of the case, it was reasonable to advise Parks to accept
the state’s plea offer.
Indeed, the state’s plea offer, which allowed Parks to recommend any
lawful sentence to the district court, improved his sentencing prospects –
particularly considering the evidence of Parks’ guilt possessed by the state. In
Idaho, the penalty for first-degree murder in a non-capital case is “a life sentence
with a minimum period of confinement of not less than ten (10) years during
which period of confinement the offender shall not be eligible for parole or
discharge or credit or reduction of sentence for good conduct, except for
meritorious service.” I.C. § 18-4004. The maximum sentence in a non-capital
first-degree murder case is fixed life. Id. The maximum sentence for voluntary
manslaughter is 15 years, and there is no statutorily-mandated minimum
sentence. I.C. § 18-4007(1).
Further, the state’s plea offer was desirable to Parks because it permitted
him to remain released on bond pending sentencing. (R., Vol. I, p.96.) During
the mediation process prior to the entry of his guilty plea, Parks informed his trial
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counsel that this pre-sentencing release was his “main concern.” (R., Vol. III,
p.526; Tr., p.343, L.23 – p.344, L.5.)
It is also clear from the record that trial counsel actively pursued a defense
and/or mitigation, and that the advice given to Parks was strategic and not based
upon some objective shortcoming such as inattentiveness or neglect.

Trial

counsel frequently communicated with Parks about the case, reviewed the
evidence, and discussed the possibility of formally retaining a forensic
pathologist. (R., Vol. III, pp.525-526; Tr., p.194, L.19 – p.196, L.25; p.292, L.9 –
p.300, L.13.)
Trial counsel consulted two forensic pathologists about the case. (R., Vol.
III, pp.525-526; Tr., p.330, L.17 – p.331, L.16.) Counsel declined to retain the
first pathologist because he wasn’t willing to testify at a trial, and then ultimately
declined to retain the second pathologist because a plea agreement had been
reached with the state. (R., Vol. III, pp.365, 525-526; Tr., p.330, L.17 – p.331,
L.1.)

Trial counsel also consulted an expert to review the state’s fire

investigation. (Tr., p.331, L.17 – p.331, L.8.) This expert concluded that while
there could be no definitive certainty that the fire was “human-caused,” there was
no evidence supporting any other explanation. (Tr., p.331, L.17 – p.332, L.8.)
Trial counsel also retained a private investigator to assist in the investigation.
(Tr., p.294, L.11 – p.295, L.4.) At the change of plea hearing, Parks informed the
court that he was happy with his trial counsel’s assistance at that point. (R., Vol.
II, pp.296-297.)
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Trial counsel also considered and discussed the possibility of attempting
to develop defense theories, including one based upon Sarah’s asthma (R., Vol.
III, p.528; Tr., p.336, L.9 – p.337, L.1), and one based upon a theoretical
alternative perpetrator – before Parks specifically requested that counsel not
pursue the latter option (Tr., p.334, L.14 – p.335, L.10).
The state presented an affidavit and expert testimony from defense
attorney Paul Clark, who had, at the time, 45 years of experience in criminal law,
including criminal defense.
L.21.)

(R., Vol. IV, pp.750-755; Tr., p.276, p.3 – p.288,

Clark reviewed the relevant materials and concluded that Parks’ trial

counsel’s decisions to accept the state’s plea offer and forgo further investigation
were reasonable based upon the strength of the state’s evidence and other
circumstances of the case. (R., Vol. IV, pp.752-753; Tr., p.283, L.13 – p.286,
L.25.) Clark also agreed with trial counsel’s assessment that Parks was likely to
face conviction on both counts of first-degree murder if he proceeded to trial,
even if trial counsel had obtained the conclusions of Dr. Arden at that point. (R.,
Vol. IV, p.752; Tr., p.287, Ls.9-25.)
Finally, the district court also properly concluded that Parks failed to
demonstrate that his trial counsel provided deficient performance by failing to
retain a forensic pathologist to present evidence at Parks’ sentencing hearing
regarding Sarah Parks’ cause of death. (R., Vol. VI, p.1272.) As the court noted
(id.), it would not have considered evidence presented at the sentencing hearing
for the purpose of attempting to negate guilt. See, e.g., United States v. Hunt,
521 F.3d 636, 649 (6th Cir. 2008) (“it would be improper for the judge in
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sentencing to rely on facts directly inconsistent with those found by the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt”).
In light of the strength of the state’s case, the admissions of guilt Parks
made to trial counsel, and the desirability of the state’s plea offer, Parks has
failed to show that the district court erred by concluding that trial counsel’s
performance was not deficient.

Parks has therefore failed to show that the

district court erred in denying this claim.
2.

Parks Failed To Demonstrate Prejudice From Any Alleged Deficient
Performance
While the district court did not reach the issue of Strickland prejudice,

Parks has also failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any alleged
deficiency of his trial counsel. A review of the record reveals that the proposed
expert testimony would have had only limited value to Parks’ defense.
The state notes the inherent difficulty in weighing the strength of “new”
defense expert conclusions, acquired long after a defendant pleads guilty,
against the state’s evidence of guilt which was never fully developed because the
defendant chose to plead guilty and waive his right to require the state to prove
its case and to present a defense to the charges. 6 (See R., Vol. II, pp.287-288.)
Parks ended the state’s investigation into the underlying crimes by pleading
guilty. Parks then, only after receiving a sentence that exceeded his sentencing
recommendation, sought new expert testimony to attack the state’s evidence.

6

The state further notes that each of the cases cited by Parks in the section of
his Appellant’s brief setting forth the law applicable to ineffective assistance of
counsel challenges concerning investigations and expert witnesses involve cases
where the defendant was convicted after a jury trial. (Appellant’s brief, pp.33-37.)
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Even acknowledging this difficulty and the incompleteness of the state’s case, it
is clear from the record that Parks has failed to demonstrate Strickland prejudice,
even assuming that his trial counsel provided deficient performance.

As

discussed above, the state presented substantial evidence of Parks’ guilt at the
preliminary hearing, and the state’s theory of the case was supported by witness
testimony, the known time-line of events, the fire investigation conclusions, and
the state’s autopsy report.
Weighed against this evidence, the expert testimony now set forth by
Parks would have been of limited value to his defense, even assuming trial
counsel was able to retain this particular Virginia-based expert, or another expert
who might have come to similar conclusions.

Dr. Arden did not propose an

alternative cause of death or even identify evidence supporting any other cause
of death; he simply offered potential impeachment evidence to challenge the
conclusions of the state autopsy performed by Dr. Reynolds. This is significant
because the state was not required to prove any specific cause of death to
satisfy the causation element of first-degree murder, only that Parks “engaged in
conduct which caused the death of” Sarah Parks. (See I.C.J.I. 74.)
In fact, several of Dr. Arden’s conclusions amounted to mere
inconsequential critiques of the procedures utilized during Dr. Reynolds’ autopsy
of Sarah Parks. Neither Dr. Arden, nor Parks, has attempted to explain how
these critiques demonstrate Strickland prejudice.

For example, Dr. Arden

criticized Dr. Reynolds for conducting the autopsy at a funeral home, for not
weighing Sarah Parks’ organs, and for failing to wait for the results of a toxicology
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report (which ultimately came back negative), before reaching a conclusion
regarding Parks’ cause of death. (R., Vol. II, pp.263-266; Tr., p.106, L.7 – p.107,
L.3.) It is unclear how any of these critiques, even if valid, ultimately impacted
Dr. Reynolds’ relevant conclusions or prejudiced Parks.
Further, Dr. Arden reached numerous conclusions which supported, or at
least did not directly contradict or effectively challenge, the state’s theory of the
case and Dr. Reynolds’ reported cause of death. Dr. Arden acknowledged that it
was “reasonable to consider some form of asphyxiation considering the
circumstances,” and that Parks, in fact, “could have” died from strangulation or
suffocation. (R., Vol. II, p.265; Tr., p.111, Ls.14-18; p.112, Ls.9-17.) Importantly,
Dr. Arden also agreed with Dr. Reynolds’ conclusion that Sarah Parks was dead
before the fire burned her body. (Tr., p.108, Ls.13-25.)
Additionally, while Dr. Arden emphasized that “in order to figure out why
people died,” one must rely not only on the medical findings but also the context
provided by “history and circumstances relating to the death” (Tr., p.77, L.18 –
p.78, L.8; p.90, Ls.7-24), Dr. Arden did not himself review the crime scene
investigation reports, police reports, witness statements, or fire investigation
reports (Tr., p.101, L.22 – p.103, L.10).
Parks’ trial counsel testified that in light of this limited usefulness of
Dr. Arden’s report, his advice to Parks to take the state’s plea offer would not
have changed even if he possessed the information at the time he advised
Parks. (Tr., p.322, L.16 – p.323, L.4.) Therefore, it is likely that trial counsel’s
advice to Parks regarding the plea offer would have also remained unchanged.
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Even had Dr. Arden testified at a trial, the jury would have had to weigh his
conclusions against those of Dr. Reynolds, who is a well-qualified board-certified
forensic pathologist. In his 30-year career, Dr. Reynolds has conducted over
3,000 autopsies and has never been disciplined by the Board of Medicine or any
other licensing board. (Exhibits, pp.50, 61-63.7) Dr. Arden, relied upon by Parks,
quit his job as a chief medical examiner in Washington D.C. while under
investigation from the Inspector General’s Office. (Tr., p.103, Ls.17-22.) Among
the ultimate findings of the investigation was that Dr. Arden’s histology laboratory
was not properly vented, waste chemicals were not properly stored and disposed
of, and that there was no standardized procedure for autopsies. (Tr., p.103, L.23
– p.104, L.8.)
Considering the limitations of Dr. Arden’s testimony, as weighed against
the substantial evidence of guilt presented by the state at the preliminary hearing,
Parks has failed to demonstrate Strickland prejudice, even assuming that trial
counsel was deficient as alleged. This Court should therefore affirm the district
court’s denial of this claim.
II.
Parks Has Failed To Demonstrate That He Is Entitled To Relief On His I.C.
§ 19-4901(a)(4) New Evidence Claim
A.

Introduction
Parks, citing I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4), contends that he was entitled to post-

conviction relief due to “newly presented material facts not previously presented
7

Exhibits in the appellate record are contained within the electronic file,
“EXHIBITS.pdf.” Citations to page numbers of the “Exhibits” refer to the page
numbers of this file.
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and heard” which, Parks asserts, require a vacating of his convictions and/or
sentence “in the interest of justice.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.41-45.) On appeal,
Parks has failed to assign specific error to the district court’s denial with respect
to this claim.

(See generally id.)

Parks has therefore waived this issue for

appeal. Further, Parks has failed to preserve this issue for appeal because his
corresponding I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) claim was bare and conclusory as presented
to the district court, and because the expanded argument he now brings on
appeal was not raised below. Finally, even if this Court reaches the merits of this
claim, Parks has failed to demonstrate he is entitled to relief because the
apparent “new evidence” of Dr. Arden’s report is merely impeaching and would
not have probably produced an acquittal.
B.

Parks Has Waived This Issue On Appeal Because He Has Failed To
Assign Specific Error To The District Court
As discussed above, it is a well-settled tenet of appellate review that the

“party alleging error has the burden of showing it in the record.”

Akers,

156 Idaho 37, 320 P.3d 428. It is equally well-settled that the appellate court will
not review actions of the district court for which no error has been assigned and
will not otherwise search the record for unspecified errors. Hoisington, 104 Idaho
at 159, 657 P.2d at 23. Moreover, “[a] party waives an issue on appeal if either
authority or argument are lacking.” Freitas, 157 Idaho at 267, 335 P.3d at 607
(citing Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970).
In this case, Parks has failed to assign any specific error to the district
court regarding his I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) new evidence claim. (See Appellant’s
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brief, pp.41-45.) In fact, Parks has failed to allege any district court error at all.
Both the “Issues Presented on Appeal” and “Argument” sections of Parks’
Appellant’s brief assert only that Parks is entitled to relief under I.C. § 194901(a)(4), not that the district court erred in denying the claim or by failing to
rule on it. (Id.) This Court should not conduct a blanket review of the district
court’s findings and legal analysis in the absence of such assigned error.
Because Parks has failed to assign any error, let alone specific error, to
the district court, he has waived this claim for consideration on appeal. This
Court should therefore decline to search the record for unspecified errors and
instead affirm the district court’s order dismissing Parks’ post-conviction petition.
C.

In The Alternative, Parks Has Failed To Preserve This Claim In The
Manner In Which He Now Raises It On Appeal
It is well-settled that Idaho’s appellate courts “will not consider issues not

raised in the court below.” State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 833, 252 P.3d 563,
566 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 407, 825 P.2d 501,
504 (1992)).

Additionally, bare or conclusory post-conviction allegations,

unsubstantiated by any fact, are inadequate to entitle a petitioner to an
evidentiary hearing and are subject to summary dismissal.

Roman v. State,

125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994); Baruth v. Gardner,
110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho
822, 826, 702 P.2d 860, 864 (Ct. App. 1985).
Idaho Code § 19-4901(a)(4) provides that a petitioner may seek postconviction relief on the ground that “there exists evidence of material facts, not
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previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or
sentence in the interest of justice.”
Where a criminal defendant is convicted after a trial, “[t]he request for a
new trial in a post-conviction proceeding based on newly discovered evidence
[pursuant to § 19-4901(a)(4)] is the same as a motion for new trial subsequent to
a jury verdict.” Whiteley v. State, 131 Idaho 323, 326, 955 P.2d 1102, 1105
(1998).

In State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976), the Idaho

Supreme Court articulated the four-part test a defendant must satisfy in order to
be entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. That test
requires a defendant to show that the evidence offered in support of his motion
for a new trial: (1) is newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the
time of trial; (2) is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) will probably
produce an acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of the evidence was due to no lack
of diligence on the part of the defendant. Id. at 691, 551 P.2d at 978. The
burden to show that each of these criteria is satisfied rests with the movant.
State v. Dopp, 129 Idaho 597, 605, 930 P.2d 1039, 1047 (Ct. App. 1996).
In announcing this four-part test, the Court cited Professor Wright’s text on
Federal Practice and Procedure and specifically noted his comment, “after a man
has had his day in court, and has been fairly tried, there is a proper reluctance to
give him a second trial.” Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 978 (citation
omitted). “Motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are
disfavored and should be granted with caution, reflecting the importance
accorded to considerations of repose, regularity of decision making, and
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conservation of scarce judicial resources.” State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144,
191 P.3d 217, 222 (2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (quoting
State v. Hayes, 144 Idaho 574, 577, 165 P.3d 288, 291 (Ct. App. 2007)).
The state has found no case where an Idaho Appellate Court has
determined whether the Drapeau standard, or some other standard, applies to an
I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) post-conviction new evidence claim where the defendant
pled guilty in the underlying criminal case, or whether such a defendant may
even seek relief under that subsection. In this case, neither Parks, the state, nor
the district court cited Drapeau or presented any analysis regarding the question
of how, or if, Parks could demonstrate whether any newly discovered evidence in
this case necessitated a vacating of his conviction or sentence “in the interest of
justice.”
Instead, in his memorandum in support of his amended post-conviction
petition, Parks described the basis of his I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) claim merely as
follows:
Although the above analysis [with respect to Parks’
ineffective assistance of counsel claims] is sufficient to resolve this
matter in favor of Mr. Parks on constitutional grounds rooted in the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, this reasoning set forth above
applies with equal force in the context of Idaho Code § 194901(a)(4), and the entirety of the above analysis is incorporated
herein.
(R., Vol. II, p.399.) Parks did not provide any additional analysis or argument
with respect to this claim in his written closing argument following the evidentiary
hearing. (R., Vol. VI, pp.1234-1235.)
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Therefore, while the state presumes that Dr. Arden’s report constitutes the
“new evidence” Parks contends warrants a vacating of his judgment of
conviction, Parks did not specifically identify such evidence to the district court or
present argument explaining why such evidence entitled him to relief under I.C.
§ 19-4901(a)(4). Therefore, this claim, as presented to the district court, was
bare and conclusory.
In its brief in support of its motion for summary dismissal, the state, like
Parks, simply referred to its prior arguments regarding Parks’ ineffective
assistance of counsel claims in its response to Parks’ I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) new
evidence claim. (R., Vol. III, p.475.) In a reply brief submitted in support of its
motion for reconsideration of the district court’s partial denial of its motion for
summary dismissal, the state again only briefly addressed the I.C. § 194901(a)(4) claim, and stated that this claim “does not provide an independent
basis for a post-conviction relief, but rather is a legal question to be considered
only if the remaining issue [of Parks’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims] is
answered in the affirmative.” (R., Vol. III, pp.583-584.) The state continued, “[i]f
the [district] [c]ourt finds that Parks’ trial counsel made a reasonable decision that
made further investigation into the cause of Sarah Parks’ death unnecessary,
than the [I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4)] issue is moot.” (R., Vol. III, p.584.) The state
again only

briefly referenced the I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) claim in its closing

argument following the evidentiary hearing. (R., Vol. VI, p.1249.)
The district court did not analyze or specifically rule on Parks’ I.C. § 194901(a)(4) claim in either its order partially granting the state’s motion for
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summary dismissal or its final “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law” order
entered following the evidentiary hearing. (See R., Vol. III, pp.494-501; R., Vol.
VI, pp.1267-1274.) In its order partially granting the state’s motion for summary
dismissal, the district court stated that “the report authored by Dr. Arden presents
evidence of a material fact not previously presented to the [c]ourt.” (R., Vol. III,
p.498.) However, the court did not further analyze or rule on the I.C. § 194901(a)(4) claim and instead made this statement only in the context of its
analysis of Parks’ first ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (See id.)
Thus, it is apparent from the record that Parks presented his I.C. § 194901(a)(4) new evidence claim only in a conclusory manner to the district court,
and that the state and the court did not analyze the claim as a distinct ground for
relief requiring its own analysis, but instead as a gateway through which Parks’
ineffective assistance of counsel claims must pass before he was entitled to
relief.
On appeal, Parks presents his I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) new evidence claim in
a somewhat expanded manner. (Appellant’s brief, pp.41-45.) Specifically, Parks
asserts that I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) “is a broad grant of authority from the legislature
[to] the judicial branch to ensure that justice is done in criminal proceedings in the
State of Idaho.” (Appellant’s brief, p.43.) Parks additionally contends that he is
entitled to I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) relief in this case because of “the failure by the
defense counsel to duly investigate, Dr. Arden’s findings and conclusions
demonstrating a bona fide defense, the unusual pressures placed on Mr. Parks
by counsel, and the District Court’s failure to require a factual admission from
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Mr. Parks at the change of plea hearing (at the joint request of the prosecution
and the defense attorneys).” (Id.) Parks thus appears to interpret I.C. § 194901(a)(4) as a catch-all provision granting the judicial branch broad authority to
grant discretionary relief.
Parks failed to preserve this proposed interpretation of I.C. § 194901(a)(4) for appellate review because he did not present it to the district court.
By presenting his I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) new evidence claim to the district court in
a conclusory manner, Parks deprived the court of the opportunity to consider the
claim in the manner in which he now presents it on appeal. This Court should
therefore decline to consider this claim.
D.

Even If This Court Considers The Merits Of Parks’ I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4)
Claim, Parks Has Failed To Show He Is Entitled To Relief
Finally, in the alternative, if this Court chooses to reach the merits of Parks’

I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) new evidence claim, Parks has failed to demonstrate he is
entitled to relief.

First, the state disputes Parks’ contention that I.C. § 19-

4901(a)(4) constitutes a “broad grant of authority” that a court may wield in the
flexible manner advocated for by Parks on appeal. Parks has cited no authority
standing for the proposition that a I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) new evidence claim is
subject to a standard any less restrictive than the Drapeau standard, and
therefore, has waived this claim on appeal.

See Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263,

923 P.2d at 970 (a party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument
is lacking).

28

Instead, as the state noted above, it is well established that a postconviction petitioner who was found guilty after a jury trial in his underlying
criminal

proceeding

must

satisfy the four-prong

Drapeau

standard

to

demonstrate that he is entitled to relief under I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4). See, e.g,
Whiteley, 131 Idaho at 326, 955 P.2d at 1105; Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720,
723, 932 P.2d 348, 351 (1996); Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 365-367, 924 P.2d
622, 627-629 (Ct. App. 1996); Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 30-31, 995 P.2d 794,
800-801 (2000). There is no reason why a post-conviction petitioner who pled
guilty in his underlying criminal proceeding, and who therefore waived his right to
require the state to prove his guilt and to put on a defense, should be entitled to
some more-forgiving standard than Drapeau.
However, even assuming, without conceding, that the Drapeau standard
applies under these circumstances, Parks clearly could not satisfy this standard
because Dr. Arden’s report provided, at best, impeachment evidence, and
because the report would not probably produce an acquittal.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has described the difference between
impeachment evidence and substantive evidence as follows:
Unlike substantive evidence which is offered for the purpose
of persuading the trier of fact as to the truth of a proposition on
which the determination of the tribunal is to be asked, impeachment
is that which is designed to discredit a witness, i.e. to reduce the
effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth the evidence which
explains why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony.
State v. Marsh, 141 Idaho 862, 868-869, 119 P.3d 637, 643-644 (Ct. App. 2004).
Evidence may be both substantive and impeaching. Id.
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In this case, Dr. Arden’s conclusions provided only, at best, impeachment
evidence because he did not affirmatively set forth any alternative cause of death
or cause of the fire. Instead, had these conclusions been utilized at a theoretical
jury trial, they would have been offered only to attempt to discredit the
conclusions of Dr. Reynolds.
Finally, the Dr. Arden report, even if it had been presented at a theoretical
jury trial, would not probably have resulted in an acquittal. For this proposition,
the state relies on its arguments, presented above, regarding the strength of the
state’s case and the limited defense value of Dr. Arden’s conclusions.
Parks waived his I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) new evidence claim because he
failed to assign specific error to the district court, and because he failed to
preserve the claim in the manner he now presents it on appeal. In any event,
even if this Court reaches the merits of this claim, Parks cannot demonstrate that
Dr. Arden’s report satisfied the Drapeau standard. This Court should therefore
decline to find that Parks is entitled to relief on this claim.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s
order dismissing Parks’ petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 31st day of July, 2017.

_/s/ Mark W. Olson__________
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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